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7TIME TO REEXAMINE REGULATION DESIGNED TO COUNTER THE 
FINANCING OF TERRORISM
Richard Barrett*
I. INTRODUCTION
The attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, stunned the 
world and demanded an immediate response. But the perpetrators of the 
attacks were dead, their identities undiscovered, their cause obscure, and 
their associates hidden. Although the United States had the option to initiate 
immediate military action against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, even then, was too 
nebulous a target to defeat by military means alone. Instead, the U.S di-
rected the main thrust of its non-military action against the financing of 
terrorism, and a great deal of new regulation resulted. It is not easily deter-
mined what impact this regulation has had on the terrorist threat, though it 
has had considerable consequences for the financial community.  
This article looks at the development of regulation designed to 
counter the financing of terrorism in the aftermath of the attacks of Septem-
ber 2001. It looks at Al Qaeda’s financial needs and how it tries to meet 
them. It notes that the cost of mounting a significant attack need not be 
large, and points out that local terrorist cells generally raise money in unob-
trusive ways. Against this background, the article questions whether the 
current amount of regulation of the financial sector has the impact that it 
intends. It suggests that it is time to reexamine rather than to increase regu-
lation, and proposes bringing the private sector into closer cooperation with 
counter terrorist officials in order to design a more effective and more dy-
namic counter terrorist financing regime. 
II. THE IMMEDIATE REACTION TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS
Before September 11, 2001, the threat from terrorism initiated by 
Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda had been of concern to counter-terrorist 
specialists but had attracted little political attention, especially at the inter-
national level.1 The United Nations Security Council had instituted the most 
 *  Richard Barrett is the Coordinator of the United Nations Al Qaeda Taliban Monitoring 
Team. The views expressed in this article are the views of the author. 
1 See generally, e.g., GEORGE TENET, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MY YEARS AT THE 
CIA (2007); Interview by Scott Pelley with George Tenet, 60 Minutes (CBS television 
broadcast Apr. 29, 2007), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/04/25/60minute
s/main2728375.shtml.
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notable international action by imposing sanctions against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan pursuant to Resolution 1267 in 1999.2 These sanctions were 
designed to put pressure on the Taliban to hand Osama bin Laden over for 
trial following the near simultaneous bombings of the United States Embas-
sies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998, for which bin Laden and 
his Al Qaeda organization were held responsible.3
Serious as the East Africa attacks were,4 the 9/11 attacks were of a 
different magnitude.5 Osama bin Laden later claimed that the 9/11 attacks 
cost the U.S. economy $500 billion.6 Although his estimate was an optimis-
tic guess, the actual costs exceed that estimate when taking into account the 
cost of all resulting counter-terrorist measures, including the wars in Afgha-
nistan and Iraq.7 In addition to the deaths and economic consequences, the 
attacks had a profound psychological impact. The attacks were not only 
carried out on American soil, but also on global television, constantly rep-
layed in every corner of the world. Even in 2001 people recognized that the 
attacks had caused a new departure in international relations.8 Although it 
was not obvious where this new departure would lead, it was clear that the 
U.S. administration was determined to show its might and its reach as soon 
as possible, as evidenced by the immediate decision to declare a war on 
terrorism.9
Seeking to strike back, the U.S. saw the Taliban regime in Afgha-
nistan as its first and clearest target. The Taliban not only provided sanctu-
ary to Osama bin Laden, but also allowed Al Qaeda a base from which to 
plan further attacks.10 The “war on terrorism” took speedy form, and by 
2 S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
3 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Demands that Taliban Turn Over 
Usama bin Laden to Appropriate Authorities, U.N. Doc. SC/6739 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
4 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, 70 (2004) (documenting the Embassy casualties at 224 killed and 
over 5000 injured).   
5 See RAND CORPORATION, COMPENSATING THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 2 (2004), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2005/RAND_RB9087.pdf (estimating civilian cas- 
ualties at 2,551 killed and 215 injured, and emergency responder casualties at 425 killed or 
seriously injured).   
6 Osama bin Laden, Message to the American People (Oct. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP81104.   
7 See generally Olivia Jackson, The Impact of the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks on the US Econ-
omy, 20 J. OF 9/11 STUDIES 1 (2008), http://www.journalof911studies.com/volume/2008/Oliv 
iaJackson911andUS-Economy.pdf.  
8 See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns, ‘In Strongest 
Terms’, Terrorist Attacks on United States, U.N. Doc. SC/7143 (Sept. 12, 2001) for state-
ments made at the 4370th meeting of the Security Council on Sept. 12, 2001.  
9 See President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001) (“[W]e stand 
together to win the war against terrorism.”).  
10 S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).   
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October the Taliban had been chased from Kabul and Al Qaeda dispersed.11
But the overthrow of the Taliban regime could not be the end of the story; it 
already was evident that Al Qaeda had no clear geographical limits, nor any 
dependence on an active, free and visible leadership. Al Qaeda was a loose-
knit global movement with a sustained capacity to inflict real harm, and 
therefore demanded a response greater than the United States or its close 
allies could provide on their own.12
The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 on September 
28, 2001, just seventeen days after the attacks.13 This elaborate and far-
reaching resolution passed unanimously, and since the Security Council had 
adopted the resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, it had manda-
tory effect for all Member States. One of the primary consequences of the 
resolution was to oblige universal compliance with the main provisions of 
the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism,14 which had been negotiated through the Gener-
al Assembly and had therefore already gained the support of a large number 
of the other 174 Member States of the United Nations.15 Following the Se-
curity Council meeting, on October 21, 2001, the Financial Action Task 
Force, set up by the G7 in 1989, adopted eight special recommendations on 
terrorist financing to add to its existing forty recommendations on anti mon-
ey laundering.16
From the start therefore, in addition to the military response, the 
U.S. and the rest of the international community were highly focused on 
preventing the financing of terrorism as a primary means of reducing the 
threat of further attacks. This was because of all the non-military actions 
that seemed necessary, perhaps dealing with the financing of terrorism 
seemed the most obvious. It also had two principal attractions: first there 
was already a great deal of work in hand, such as the negotiation of the in-
ternational convention, and second, financing was an area where the terror-
ists had to interact with the non-terrorist world. The focus on financing al-
11 See LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11 at
370 (2006).
12 See Al Qaida, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pa 
ra/al-qaida.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).  
13 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).  
14 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted  
Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270, 2178 U.N.T.S. 38349. 
15 Subsequently Switzerland, Timor L’Este, and Montengrao also joined the United Na-
tions, on September 10, 2002, September 27, 2002, and June 28, 2006, respectively. See U.N. 
Member States, List of Member States, http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml (last updated 
Oct. 3, 2006).  
16 Financial Action Task Force, Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/9/0,3343,en_32250379_32236920_34032073_1_1_1_1,0 
0.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2009) (updated to nine recommendations on Oct. 22, 2004).  
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lowed exploitation of an area of common ground where the advantage might 
lie with counter-terrorist efforts. 
Especially in the West, the idea that a group of relatively accom-
plished and well-educated men could be driven by such strong motivation to 
commit suicide in a well-planned, pre-meditated and outstandingly dramatic 
way, designed deliberately to cause the death of many others, was almost 
beyond understanding. There was no immediate effort to analyze what had 
given rise to this motivation, nor how to undermine it; it was assumed to be 
an expression of the Al Qaeda agenda, in itself opaque and seemingly irre-
levant to the modern world. What was known in 2001 about the demands 
and grievances of Al Qaeda had been learned from statements made by its 
leaders, including Osama bin Laden’s “Declaration of War Against the 
Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” first published in 
the London newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi in August 1996.17 These demands 
were not only unrealistic and unacceptable, they offered no basis for dialo-
gue—not that there was then, nor has been since, any serious talk of negoti-
ation.18 What was required in response to Al Qaeda was international soli-
darity behind an effort to starve the movement of resources and stifle its 
development.  
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATION AND ITS IMPACT
A new global regime emerged to counter the flow of money to Al 
Qaeda. This was based in part on the international regulation introduced by 
the United Nations and in part on regional initiatives, such as the FATF 
Eight Special Recommendations.19 Other regional bodies and individual 
States that introduced their own rules for financial institutions operating 
within their jurisdictions, such as Executive Order 13224 made by former 
President George W. Bush on September 23, 2001, extended this regime.20
The rules and regulations introduced by the U.S. had a particular impact, not 
only because of the size of the U.S. financial market, but also because the 
regulations demanded compliance beyond the territorial limits of the U.S. to 
include “all U.S. persons and entities . . . wherever located.”21 The 
17 See Bin Laden’s Fatwa, ONLINE NEWSHOUR,  http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/in 
ternational/fatwa_1996.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). 
18 See JONATHAN POWELL, GREAT HATRED, LITTLE ROOM: MAKING PEACE IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND (2008), which sparked some discussion of the need to negotiate with Al Qaeda, but 
no negotiations occurred.  
19 FATF adopted a ninth special recommendation, covering cash couriers, in October 
2004. See Financial Action Task Force, supra note 16. 
20 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66. Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).  
21 Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Terrorism Sanctions,
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/terror/terror.shtml (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2009). 
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PATRIOT Act, signed into law in October 2001, added further demands on 
U.S. financial institutions doing business abroad and on foreign banks doing 
business in the U.S., including increased record keeping and reporting re-
quirements.22
Regulation designed to counter the financing of terrorism took cen-
ter stage after 9/11, and the importance and urgency of preventing further 
attacks meant that financial institutions subject to the regulation risked fines 
and serious reputational harm should they fail to comply, or be accused of 
less than full compliance with the rules. The new regulation and enforce-
ment therefore has had considerable impact on the way that financial mar-
kets operate, and on the level of State control and inspection.23 What might 
have been regarded before as unnecessarily intrusive now has become ac-
ceptable as a set of precautionary measures. As a result, the cost of doing 
business has risen for banks and other financial institutions that now must 
ensure due diligence in knowing their customers and checking that transac-
tions will not benefit sanctioned individuals or entities.24 As one example, 
the number of Suspicious Transaction Reports25 submitted to U.S. authori-
ties by regulated financial institutions in 2000 was a little over 163,000; in 
2007 the total was over 1.25 million.26 Despite the extra burden created by 
the new regulation and the administrative structures to support it, few 
people inside or outside the private sector have questioned publicly the fun-
damental necessity for such regulation, nor whether it is worthwhile.  
The lack of public discussion is not necessarily surprising. The 
global nature of financial markets and the similarity of financial instruments 
in use around the world suggest the need for a universal regime. A hole in 
the defenses, wherever it might be, could allow money to enter the system 
and flow to a recipient planning or supporting terrorism. Regulation should 
apply universally so as to close all possible gaps, and to ensure uniformity 
of effort. From the point of view of the financial sector, universal applica-
tion and enforcement also has the advantage of ensuring that rivals operat-
ing in other jurisdictions have no unwarranted competitive edge as a result.  
22 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, USA PATRIOT 
Act, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). 
23 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Enforcement Ac-
tions, http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/#eaf (last visited Feb. 7, 2009) (listing enforce-
ment actions in the United States).  
24 While it is not easy to compute these costs, a study in 2003 commissioned by the United 
Kingdom Financial Services Authority found that some firms surveyed estimated that com-
pliance had led to a twenty percent increase in their operating costs, though most believed the 
increase was in single figures. See EUROPE ECONOMICS, COSTS OF COMPLIANCE 21 (2003), 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/cost_compliance.pdf. 
25 Suspicious Transaction Reports are also known as Suspicious Activity Reports. 
26 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, SAR Activity Review 
by the Numbers, http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_by_numb_10.pdf.  
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It is worth asking, however, whether international agreement on the 
necessity and nature of the new regulation exists because States agree that 
the regulation is well designed to attack specific terrorist methodology, or 
because the regulators have identified weak points within the financial sys-
tem that may be exploited for terrorist purposes. The answer to this question 
is important because regulation based on assumption is less likely to be ef-
fective in achieving its purpose than regulation based on analysis. This is 
not to say that regulation should be designed exclusively by experts in ter-
rorism, but nor should it be designed solely by experts in financing. Both 
groups must play a part, and they should do so in concert. If not, it is possi-
ble that the slightest suggestion that terrorists are funding their operations 
through precious stones, stored value cards, inflated invoices or through any 
of the thousands of other ways that exist to make money at the edge of the 
law, would trigger a totally unwarranted and burdensome set of new regula-
tions. Carried to the extreme, this would impact all international trade, in-
cluding other ways to store and move money that are currently beyond the 
reach of regulation, if only because they exist in the virtual world. 
Any bureaucratic response to an immediate problem will tend to in-
troduce new regulation and then adapt it, rather than risk delay by first con-
ducting an extensive study of the problem and only afterwards designing a 
regulation that fully meets the needs of the specific challenge. In 2001, with 
little understanding of the realm of terrorism and with the fear that another 
devastating attack could happen at any time, such a precipitate approach 
was understandable. Now, however, seven years and considerable study 
later, it is perhaps appropriate not only to consider whether further regula-
tion is necessary to address current terrorist methodology, but also to cast 
aside or trim away regulation that does not seem to have been particularly 
relevant or effective. It is, of course, difficult to measure the impact of the 
regulations, because they are designed to prevent things from happening and 
there is no way to know what might have happened without them. But given 
the resources devoted to countering the financing of terrorism and the costs 
of getting it wrong, a re-examination of what has been ordained and a re-
calibration based on what is known, is not merely overdue, but is some-
where between important and essential. 
IV. AL QAEDA’S NEED FOR MONEY AND ITS FUNDING CHANNELS
The ways that a terrorist group finances itself depends on several 
factors, most importantly opportunity. Most terrorist organizations are local 
and depend either on local sources of money or on sources with a local con-
nection. The Tamil Tigers, for example, raise money in whatever way is 
easiest in Sri Lanka, but also benefit from money-raising activity within 
2009] REGULATION OF TERRORISM FINANCING 13
Tamil communities abroad.27 Similarly, the Real Irish Republican Army 
(RIRA), now largely inactive, raised money in the immediate area of its 
operations in Northern Ireland, but at the same time received support from 
Irish-origin sympathizers in the U.S.28 Al Qaeda is different in that it has 
little opportunity to raise funds in its local heartland on the Afghan-Pakistan 
border, and has no specific expatriate ethnic group to rely on. 
All terrorism is politically motivated and seeks to achieve political 
change. The terrorism perpetrated by Al Qaeda, however, is political protest 
that also seeks cultural change—it seeks the righting of wrongs and the re-
writing of history. Al Qaeda has no realistic forward-looking political pro-
gram or obvious short-term goals. It is not like the Tamil Tigers or the 
RIRA in having a clear desire for more influence in a particular country or 
political sphere; rather, it wants the world to be different. As such its appeal 
is very broad and can sweep up an individual with deep grievances about his 
own personal situation along with a broad idealist seeking a new world or-
der.29
Given the range of its adherents and the generality of its program, 
Al Qaeda does not need a highly organized structure with established sys-
tems of recruitment, training, financing and operational planning. Al Qaeda 
has moved on from the days when it was an organization for Arab fighters 
in Afghanistan with guesthouses and a series of training camps where indi-
viduals went according to nationality and even according to specialty.30
Although fairly shambolic, at that time there was an attempt at organization. 
In 2001, however, Al Qaeda lost its safe haven in Afghanistan and with it 
the organizational infrastructure that it had built up since Osama bin Laden 
returned there from Sudan in 1996.31 From then on Al Qaeda became an 
amorphous movement comprising disconnected cells which drifted further 
apart in the absence of central direction.32
27 For a brief account of the Tamil Tigers, see Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ltte.htm (last visi- 
ted Feb. 7, 2009). 
28 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on 
Terrorism, Apr. 30, 2008, available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103714.htm.   
29 See generally MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (2008). 
30 See WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 141, 182;  Statement of Facts of Defendant at 1, United 
States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Apr. 22, 2005), available at
http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/library/moussaoui/1_01-cr-00455/docs/70543/0.pdf.    
31 See Michael Radu, Visitors of Death, FRONTPAGE MAGAZINE, Aug. 23, 2004, 
http://www.frontpagemag.com/articles/Read.aspx?GUID=49AC7DFF-1C4E-4D0C-A803-
D14C7670A71A.   
32 See Al Qaida, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pa 
ra/al-qaida.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). 
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Without other choice, these cells have had to find ways to finance 
themselves. The central leadership has managed to find a secure new base in 
the Afghan-Pakistani border area. The needs of the local cells are relatively 
modest, and both reflect and limit their ambitions. Al Qaeda attacks since 
9/11 have not been expensive. There is little definitive calculation of costs 
but even the November 2003 suicide bombings in Istanbul, which attacked 
four targets in two double bombings five days apart and involved the hiring 
of light trucks and a warehouse in which to construct the bombs, is unlikely 
to have cost more than $40,000.33 The attacks on trains in and around Ato-
cha station in Madrid in March 2004 cost around $10,000, excluding the 
drugs imported from Morocco which were bartered for explosives.34 The 
suicide attacks on the London transport system in July 2007 were estimated 
by investigators to have cost less than $16,000.35 The London bombers ap-
pear to have paid for the materials used in the attacks with their savings, 
credit cards, personal loans, and bounced checks.36
Fundraising has been easier in some areas than in others. In Iraq for 
example, Al Qaeda found it could attract recruits who would bring some 
money with them, and it also had wide opportunity to indulge in all sorts of 
lucrative criminality, from kidnap and ransom, extortion, oil smuggling and 
car theft, to siphoning off a percentage of the huge amounts of reconstruc-
tion aid that has poured into the country.37
Things have not been so easy for Al Qaeda’s leadership. It too has 
needed money to rent compounds, pay for security, maintain the families of 
fallen comrades, and find ways to reassert its presence, if only by develop-
ing a sophisticated propaganda operation.38 The leadership no doubt also 
has understood that to be able to plan and organize further spectacular at-
tacks, it needs money to contact, train and direct new operatives. Tradition-
ally, Al Qaeda has relied on donations from supporters or money from un-
33 See First Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, ¶45, deli-
vered to the Security Council, U.N. DOC. S/2004/679 (Aug. 25, 2004), available at 
http://www.undemocracy.com/S-2004-679.pdf.  
34 See Phil Williams, Terroris Financing and Organized Crime: Nexus, Appropriation, or 
Trasformation?, in COUNTERING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 126, 144 (Thomas J. Biers-
teker & Sue E. Eckert eds., 2008).
35 See HOUSE OF COMMONS, REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BOMBINGS IN 
LONDON ON 7TH JULY 2005 (May 2006), H.C. 1087, at 23, available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/7-july-report?view=Binary. 
36 See id.
37 See Lennox Samuels, Al Qaida Nostra, NEWSWEEK, May 21, 2008, http://www.newsw 
eek.com/id/138085. 
38 See Eighth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, ¶13, deli-
vered to the Security Council, U.N. DOC. S/2008/324 (May 14, 2008). 
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witting donors to humanitarian causes.39 But after 2001, many sources dried 
up, whether as a result of State regulation or because the attacks in the U.S. 
caused revulsion.40 Even in 2008, there were reports of Ayman Al-Zawahiri 
trying to revive a financial support network in the Arabian Peninsula.41
The extent of the problems faced by the Al Qaeda leadership can al-
so be seen from a letter written by Ayman Al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab Al-
Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, in July 2005.42 This letter set out to 
rein in Zarqawi, an unruly (and in many ways unwelcome) associate whose 
brutality was undermining support for Al Qaeda in the Muslim world.43 But 
Zawahiri could not just discard Zarqawi; first, he needed him to wear an Al 
Qaeda label because he was the most visible part of the Iraq resistance and 
the Al Qaeda leadership needed the advertising, kudos and suggestion of 
relevance that the association with Zarqawi provided, and second because 
Zarqawi had money. Zawahiri’s letter therefore mixes criticism with encou-
ragement and also asks for $100,000.44 Similarly, Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid, 
the head of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, noted in an interview in May 2007 
that money was the greatest need for the organization.45 These facts all con-
firm that money is important for Al Qaeda and is not as abundant as the 
leadership would like. At least some of the international action to limit the 
flow of funds has clearly had effect. 
The Al Qaeda leadership’s total income is unknown, but its ex-
penses for food, housing and protection are fairly constant, and its obliga-
tions to non-combatant dependents difficult to decrease. It is under severe 
pressure to mount attacks and back up its threats, particularly as it faces an 
increasingly skeptical and critical appraisal of its legitimacy and tactics 
from better-respected and more qualified scholars, including Sayyed Imam 
Al-Sharif, also known as Dr. Fadl, a former mentor of Zawahiri, who 
39 JOHN ROTH, DOUGLAS GREENBURG & SERENA WILLE, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING  13, available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2009). 
40 See id. at 17. 
41 See Information Office, Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Interior Ministry Warns Reci-
pients of Al-Qaeda Phone Message, IN FOCUS, Mar. 11, 2008, at 2, http://www.saudiembassy 
.net/Focus/IN-FOCUS-2008/08-FOCUS-03-11.pdf. 
42 Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (July 9, 2005), 
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/letter_in_english.pdf.
43 Id. 
44 Id.
45 Evan F. Kohlmann, Dosier: Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (a.k.a. “Shaykh Saeed”), THE 
NEFA FOUNDATION, June 2008, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDoc 
s/nefayazid0608.pdf.   
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launched an attack on Al Qaeda’s specious religious arguments in Novem-
ber 2007.46
V. TALIBAN FINANCES
The relative ease with which the Taliban can mount operations from 
the same area where the Al Qaeda leadership is located provides further 
evidence of the effectiveness of the initiatives taken to prevent money from 
reaching Al Qaeda. The Taliban has a local agenda and a local battleground. 
It recruits from the neighborhood, mainly through tribal connections, it has 
little problem moving within its area of operation and seeks confrontation 
with Afghan and international forces when it is ready for a fight.47 Given its 
opportunity to move around and its access to money, often generated from a 
tax on poppy farmers,48 the Taliban is able to recruit, train, and equip young 
men who generally have no other or no better source of employment.49
Equally important, there is little in the way of a counter narrative to per-
suade people against the Taliban. Local government is generally just as cor-
rupt as the Taliban, and cannot offer effective protection or security against 
it.50 Local government also often challenges the very livelihood of villagers 
by threatening to eradicate their poppy crops without offering any viable 
alternative livelihood, allowing them no choice but to seek Taliban protec-
tion.51 Unsurprisingly therefore, given its local focus and local sources of 
funding, the Taliban is relatively successful as a movement and largely im-
mune from international measures designed to prevent the financing of ter-
rorism.  
VI. THE CURRENT THREAT
Counter-terrorism initiatives have put the Al Qaeda leadership un-
der pressure and the most urgent challenge is now to discover and defeat 
individual cells. These cells raise relatively small amounts of money 
through legal or illegal means in order to mount whatever attack is possible 
given opportunity, imagination and resources. Where cells raise money ille-
46 See Lawrence Wright, The Rebellion Within, NEW YORKER, Aug. 1, 2008, at 37.  
47 Interview with the Director of Analysis of the National Directorate for Security, Kabul. 
(May 2008).   
48 RAPHAEL F. PERL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TALIBAN AND THE DRUG TRADE 3 (2001), 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6210.pdf. The farmgate value of opium pro-
duced in Afghanistan in 2007 is estimated at $1 billion, with the total export value to neigh-
boring countries estimated at $4 billion See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2008 WORLD 
DRUG REPORT at 40, U.N. Sales No. E.08.XI.1 (2008). 
49 See Barnett Rubin, Saving Afghanistan, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 57, 66. 
50 Id. at 57, 60–61. 
51 Id. at 69.    
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gally, the techniques and amounts involved are likely to be indistinguishable 
from the mass of other low-level financial crime that generally falls below a 
threshold that merits serious investigation.52 The Al Qaeda leadership would 
like to have reliable sources of significant amounts of money so that it can 
more easily find ways to contact and direct these individual cells and pro-
mote major attacks.  But in the absence of direct contact, Al Qaeda leaders 
have nonetheless been able to maintain influence and impart strategic guid-
ance through use of the Internet and other inexpensive communication 
tools.53
VII. A WAY FORWARD
International efforts to counter the financing of terrorism have 
achieved many positive results. Apart from any impact on the flow of mon-
ey to Al Qaeda, these efforts have built awareness of the threat, generated a 
sense of shared responsibility between States, and made it more difficult for 
all classes of major criminals, not just terrorists, to raise, move and store 
their money.54 But the international community can no more rely on coun-
tering the financing of terrorism to prevent further attacks than it can rely on 
military means. Financing is only one aspect of the problem. As Al Qaeda 
continues to dissolve into small, self-reliant groups which, independent 
from the leadership, interpret a general strategy according to local circums-
tances, financing may become decreasingly relevant to efforts to contain the 
threat. As the amounts of money used to mount attacks become smaller, 
they become harder to regulate.  
More regulation of the financial sector, however, will not necessari-
ly lead to less terrorism, and any drive towards the former should be con-
ducted without reference to the latter. While the 9/11 attacks demonstrated 
the scope of Al Qaeda’s ambition and the vulnerability of its targets, the 
attacks did not suddenly reveal the way in which Al Qaeda planned and 
financed its operations. Nor is Al Qaeda’s methodology static; Al Qaeda is 
opportunistic and highly adaptive. Any measures to counter the financing of 
terrorism therefore should aim to be equally agile, allowing effort and re-
sources to flow to where they are most needed, and the best way to decide 
52 See Craig Whitlock, Al-Qaeda Masters Terrorism On the Cheap, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 
2008 at A1.  
53 See generally Steve Coll and Susan B. Glasser, Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of 
Operations, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2005, at A1.    
54 Despite increased regulation and international efforts, however, criminals continue to 
find new ways to carry out their crimes. See generally MISHA GLENNY, MCMAFIA: A
JOURNEY THROUGH THE GLOBAL CRIMINAL UNDERWORLD (2008) (arguing that organized 
crime is enormously inventive and entrepreneurial and always at least one step ahead of the 
regulators).
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where they are most needed is to examine how terrorists have been funding 
their operations since 9/11. 
The amount of data available on terrorist financing is growing as 
terrorism cases pass through the courts and the details of investigations of 
terrorist acts become public. This evidence of what terrorists actually do to 
raise, store and move money provides an opportunity to look at the problem 
through the eyes of the terrorists themselves. Such an examination may dis-
close some general patterns, or it may disclose none. It may disclose region-
al trends or specific choke points. It may encourage greater enforcement of 
some current regulations, and it may bring into question the value of others. 
But whatever such an examination concludes, such a study will be 
of value, not only to the regulators, but also to those private institutions that 
must devote their own resources to ensure compliance with the regulations. 
The more confidence private financial institutions have that the rules they 
are asked to enforce are tested against their objectives, the more likely they 
are to enforce them willingly and effectively. Financial institutions have as 
much interest in preventing terrorist attacks as any other sector of society 
and their potential contribution as experts in financing should be harnessed 
as effectively as possible. All sides would benefit if the suspicious activity 
reports submitted by banks and similar bodies were based on real concerns 
of possible criminality rather than the fear of falling short of the regulators’ 
expectations. If the financial skills of the reporters are drawn into better 
alignment with the forensic skills of the investigators, an effective and mu-
tually reinforcing dialogue could emerge between them, with feedback and 
briefing from the investigators re-motivating and re-focusing the work of 
the reporters. It will never be possible to eliminate all terrorist financing, but 
the objective should be to minimize the risk through a flexible regulatory 
system based on collaboration with the private sector and careful examina-
tion of terrorist methodology. 
